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ABSTRACT
In April 2016, the Office of the United States Trade
Representative placed Switzerland on the Watch List of its
2016 Special 301 Report, which contains an annual review
of the state of intellectual property rights protection and
enforcement in U.S. trading partners around the world.
According to the Report, the decision to put Switzerland on
the Watch List was premised on U.S. concerns regarding
specific difficulties in Switzerland’s system of online
copyright protection and enforcement, particularly the
“Logistep” ruling issued by the Federal Supreme Court of
Switzerland in 2010. Although the Swiss authorities have
acknowledged the difficulties mentioned in the Special 301
Report, the fierce criticism raised by the U.S. seems
inappropriate, as the Swiss federal legislature decided long
ago to remedy the shortcomings in the Swiss Copyright Act
and initiated the appropriate legislative procedures in
*
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2012. Due to the nature of Switzerland’s direct democracy,
however, the legislative process is still in progress, with the
parliament awaiting the results of the public consultation
procedure during the course of the year. Despite this clear
roadmap, the United States is increasing its pressure on the
Swiss government and encourages it to move forward with
concrete and effective measures that address copyright
piracy in an appropriate and effective manner.
Over the same period of time, the most recent
legislative proposals in the field of copyright law in the
United States have come to an abrupt halt. Unprecedented
public outcry against the legislative proposals in 2012 led
to the so-called SOPA and PIPA online protests, which
resulted in a political deadlock in the field of copyright law
and policymaking. In the eyes of several legal scholars,
these protests have revealed a lack of democratic
legitimacy in the federal legislative process in the United
States, as it denies the general public any meaningful form
of participation.
Focusing on the respective histories of copyright law
and policy in the United States and Switzerland, this Article
examines how copyright lobbyists and other special interest
groups assert their influence in the legislative process, and
how their influence can be diminished. Illustrated by the
example of copyright legislation, the Article shows that the
instruments of direct democracy in Switzerland—which
ultimately caused the delays addressed in the Special 301
Report—not only effectively counterbalance the effect of
legislative lobbying, but also help to enhance public
acceptance of legislative proposals in general. Ultimately,
this Article claims that the United States could strengthen
the democratic legitimacy of its federal legislative process
by implementing a mandatory public consultation
procedure based on the model of Switzerland, which might
create a first step towards breaking the current standoff in
U.S. copyright lawmaking.
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INTRODUCTION
“On the premise that rational political opinion- and
will-formation is at all possible, the principle of
democracy only tells us how this can be institutionalized,
namely, through a system of rights that secures for each
person an equal participation in a process of legislation. .
. .”1
In the spring of every year, the Office of the United States
Trade Representative (“USTR”) releases its Special 301 Report in
which it reviews the state of intellectual property rights protection
and enforcement in U.S. trading partners around the world.2 By
referring to itself as a “positive catalyst for change,” the report
claims to serve the critical function of identifying opportunities
and challenges facing U.S.-based innovative and creative
industries operating in foreign markets.3 After several unsuccessful
attempts, the USTR eventually followed the International
Intellectual
Property
Alliance’s
(“IIPA”)4
repeated
recommendations and placed Switzerland on the 2016 Watch List.
According to the Report, the USTR based its decision on national
concerns regarding specific difficulties in Switzerland’s system of
online copyright protection and enforcement.5
1

Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a
Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy 110 (William Rehg trans., Polity
Press 1998).
2
Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2016 Special 301 Report
Executive Summary, (Apr., 2016), available at
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR-2016-Special-301-Report.pdf.
3
Id.
4
The IIPA is a private sector coalition formed in 1984, composed of trade
associations representing U.S. copyright-based industries; the coalition works to
improve international protection and enforcement of copyrighted materials and
to open foreign markets closed by piracy and other market access barriers. See
Letter to Mr. Probir Mehta, Acting Assistant USTR for IP and Innovation, IIPA
(Feb. 5, 2016), available at
http://www.iipawebsite.com/pdf/2016SPEC301COVERLETTER.PDF.
5
International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) 2016 Special 301
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As the world’s greatest producer of intellectual property,
the United States has a transparent interest in granting writers,
artists, and other creators of copyrighted material strong protection
from online piracy in the digital age.6 In fact, apart from some
philosophical discrepancies, there is a worldwide consensus that
granting creators certain exclusive rights in their works of
authorship plays a significant role in advancing cultural diversity. 7
The crucial question is, therefore, not whether such rights should
be protected, but rather how to secure that protection in an
increasingly connected world.
From a substantive point of view, it is still unclear what
impact online piracy has truly caused.8 While the copyright
industry appears to remain strong and thriving, it is certainly
possible that online piracy has prevented the industry from

Report on Copyright Protection and Enforcement, Country Report Switzerland,
IIPA (Feb. 5, 2016),
http://www.iipawebsite.com/rbc/2016/2016SPEC301SWITZERLAND.PDF, at
55.
6
National Crime Prevention Council, Intellectual Property Theft: Get Real:
Facts and Figures (Nov. 8, 2011), available at
http://www.ncpc.org/topics/intellectual-property-theft/facts-and-figures-1.
7
Paul Goldstein & P. Bernt Hugenholz, Iɴᴛᴇʀɴᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Cᴏᴘʏʀɪɢʜᴛ:
Pʀɪɴᴄɪᴘʟᴇs, Lᴀᴡ, ᴀɴᴅ Pʀᴀᴄᴛɪᴄᴇ 7 (Oxford University Press, Third Edition,
2012).
8
Although the economic profession has taken a significant number of
attempts to tackle this empirical issue, a recently published meta-analysis from
the University of Warsaw suggests that there is no clear conclusion on whether
and how unauthorized online-distribution of cultural goods affects their
authorized sales. The study identified three reasons why the literature, after two
decades of research, is so unequivocal: (1) the terms “sales” and “digital piracy”
belong to a group of poorly measurable phenomena; (2) there is no proper
instrument to identify a causal link; and (3) the complexity of the phenomenon
of “digital piracy”, including the cases of upload piracy, leak piracy, potential
piracy and the lag between the piracy and the observed sales. See Wojciech
Hardy, Michael Krawczyk, and Joanna Tyrowics, Friends of Foes? A MetaAnalysis of the Link between “Online Piracy” and Sales of Cultural Goods,
University of Warsaw, Faculty of Economic Sciences, Working Papers No.
23/2015 (171), available at
http://www.wne.uw.edu.pl/files/9214/3741/1680/WNE_WP171.pdf.
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growing even further.9 Thus, this Article deliberately refrains from
making substantive suggestions with respect to how copyright
protection should be secured. Instead, it confines itself to the
procedural questions, offering a comparative legal analysis of the
law and policymaking processes in the United States and
Switzerland.
The key impetus to this Article was the 2012 Stop Online
Piracy Act (“SOPA”) protest (also known as the SOPA and PIPA
Internet blackout, or simply the “SOPA strike”) which successfully
derailed copyright legislation in the United States for years.
Approximately six months after this unparalleled legislative defeat
for the copyright-based industries in the United States, the Federal
Council of Switzerland decided to close the gaps in its copyright
infringement enforcement by initiating the legislative process,
which is required in order to amend the Swiss Copyright Act.10 By
the end of 2015, nearly four years after the SOPA protest, the
Federal Council submitted the preliminary draft for the revised
Copyright Act, which then became subject to the public
consultation procedure until March 31, 2016.11 During the same
period, the United States Copyright Office announced that it
intended to conduct a study evaluating the impact and
effectiveness of the DMCA safe harbor provisions, seeking public
input on a number of key questions and accepting written
submissions until April 1, 2016.12
As a matter of coincidence, the legislative authorities of the
United States and Switzerland simultaneously invited the general
9

Mike Belleville, IP Wars: SOPA, PIPA, and the Fight over Online Piracy,
26 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 303, 330.
10
Urheberrechtsgesetz [URG], Loi sur le droit d’auteur [LDA], Legge sul
diritto d’autore [LDA] [Copyright Act] Oct. 9, 1992, SR 231.1 (Switz.)
(hereafter COPA).
11
Media Release, Federal Council of Switzerland (Dec. 11, 2015),
available at
https://www.ige.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Urheberrecht/e/modernisierung_urhe
berrecht_2015_e/Medienmitteilung_2015_12_11_EN.pdf.
12
Federal Register, Section 512 Study: Notice and Request for Public
Comment, Library of Congress, U.S. Copyright Office, 80 FR 81862, available
at https://federalregister.gov/a/2015-32973.
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public to participate in the further development of copyright law
and policy in their respective countries. The ideas behind the
procedures, however, strongly differed from one another. The
Section 512 study in the United States took place outside of a
specific legislative proposal. By contrast, the mandatory
consultation procedure in Switzerland is an integral part of the
country’s federal legislation process, intended to provide
information on material accuracy, feasibility of implementation,
and public acceptance of a specific federal project. 13 Using
copyright law as a practical example, this Article seeks to prove
that the implementation of direct democratic procedures such as
the mandatory consultation procedure in the legislative process
successfully prevents special interest groups from asserting undue
influence upon legislative decision-making.
The remainder of this Article unfolds in four parts. Part I
provides a brief overview of the international framework regarding
copyright protection and its deficiencies in the field of copyright
enforcement. It explains why the problems of online piracy can
only be solved through domestic legislation. Part II discusses the
influence of special interest groups on U.S. copyright legislation
and how the 2012 SOPA protests changed the political landscape
for corporate lobbyists in the field of copyright law. Shifting
perspective, Part III provides insight into the history of Swiss
copyright law and policy, focusing on the origins, rationale, and
aftermath of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court’s Logistep decision.
Part III further discusses the preliminary draft for the Swiss
Copyright Act and explains how the direct-democratic elements of
the federal legislative process successfully counterbalance the
influence asserted by special interest groups in the legislative
process. Coming full circle, Part IV discusses the shortcomings of
the federal legislative process in the United States and explains
how the implementation of a mandatory consultation procedure on
the federal level based on the model of Switzerland would not only
enhance the general public’s acceptance of copyright legislation,
13

Vernehmlassungsgesetz [VlG], Loi sur a consultation [LCo], Legga sulla
consultazione [LCo][Consultation Procedure Act] Mar. 18, 2005, SR 172.061,
art. 2 (Switz.).
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but also help to break the current standoff in copyright
policymaking.
I.

ONLINE PIRACY AND INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW
A. The International Framework

Throughout history, lawmakers all over the world have
been required to modify their copyright laws in response to new
technologies that facilitated the reproduction of pre-existing
works.14 In the Digital Age, this requirement still holds true. The
growing availability of digital content and broadband Internet
access, along with the rise of affordable cloud storage services,
enables the unauthorized distribution of copyrighted music,
movies, television programs, software, video games, books, and
images to flourish around the world.15 Because of its simplicity,
the online distribution process poses a significant challenge for
copyright owners who wish to maintain control over their works.
Taking into account how the widespread use of smartphones
allows the Internet to pervade even the remotest corners of the
planet, it should be obvious that online infringement of
copyrighted material is a challenge that calls for a global
solution.16 Due to various political and procedural difficulties,
however, a unified answer to the problem of online piracy is still a
long way off.17
International copyright issues are primarily handled
through two treaties: The Berne Convention and Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement (“TRIPS”).18 When the
Berne Convention was enacted in 1886, its primary purpose was to
14

Yafit Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and Public Choice: From
Legislative Battles to Private Ordering, 27 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 203, 227.
15
Daniel Castro, Richard Bennett & Scott Andes, Steal These Policies:
Strategies for Reducing Digital Piracy, The Information and Technology &
Innovation Foundation, Executive Summary (Dec. 2009).
16
Belleville, supra note 9 at 331.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 332.
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protect the rights of authors on an international level.19 To make
sure that authors’ rights would be respected internationally, the
Berne Convention created a “floor of protections” by establishing
minimum standards to which all member countries must adhere.20
The question of how to enforce those minimum standards
was in focus when the World Trade Organization (“WTO”)
enacted TRIPS in 1994.21 TRIPS’ enforcement provisions are
based on two different ideas of enforcement.22 First, in order to
enable copyright owners to assert their rights in all WTO member
countries, TRIPS requires that the civil and criminal enforcement
procedures in member countries meet certain performance
standards.23 Second, if a member country fails to comply with the
standards expected of its national laws, other member countries
can enforce the standards by bringing a complaint under the WTO
dispute settlement mechanism.24
In theory, TRIPS created an enforcement mechanism for all
WTO members. In practice, however, its broad and general
language does not provide a clear enough standard.25 Article 41(1)
of TRIPS merely states that “members shall ensure that
enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are available
under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of
infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this
Agreement . . . .” 26
Naturally, such an ambiguous legal standard makes it hard
for member countries to settle any disputes.27 While some scholars
19

Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the
Future, 3 J.L. & Tech. 1, 15 (1988).
20
Id.
21
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Part III, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, 869 U.N.T.S. 299 (hereinafter “TRIPS”).
22
Antony Taubman, A Practical Guide to Working with TRIPS 111 (2011).
23
Belleville, supra note 9 at 316.
24
Taubman, supra note 22.
25
Belleville, supra note 9 at 316.
26
TRIPS at art. 41(1).
27
Peter K. Yu, TRIPS ᴀɴᴅ Iᴛs Aᴄʜɪʟʟᴇs’ Hᴇᴇʟ, 18 J. Intell Prop. L. 479,
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describe these enforcement provisions as the agreement’s Achilles
heel,28 the provisions’ lack of clarity may also show that the
principles underlying copyright law and policy in different
countries are—despite Berne and TRIPS—far from universal.29
The American fair use doctrine serves as an excellent illustration
of this point. While the fair use doctrine mirrors the special place
of free speech in the United States Constitution, it permits free use
of copyrighted works under circumstances that other countries
would find hard to excuse.30
B. Rojadirecta—A Current Example
A more practical example of the lack of international unity
is the ongoing case of the Spanish TV linking site Rojadirecta,
which describes itself as “the world’s biggest sport events index”31.
In 2009, the District Court of Madrid dismissed a complaint
against Puerto 80, the owner of Rojadirecta, holding that a website
providing links to infringing content does not violate copyright
law.32 In 2010, the Appellate Court of Madrid sided with the
District Court’s earlier decision and concluded that Rojadirecta
was a legal operation.33
In contrast, in 2011, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York authorized the seizure of two
482 (2011) (quoting J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bᴀʀɢᴀɪɴɪɴɢ Aʀᴏᴜɴᴅ ᴛʜᴇ
TRIPS Aɢʀᴇᴇᴍᴇɴᴛ: Tʜᴇ Cᴀsᴇ fᴏʀ Oɴɢᴏɪɴɢ Pᴜʙʟɪᴄ-Pʀɪᴠᴀᴛᴇ Iɴɪᴛɪᴀᴛɪᴠᴇs ᴛᴏ
Fᴀᴄɪʟɪᴛᴀᴛᴇ Wᴏʀʟᴅᴡɪᴅᴇ Iɴᴛᴇʟʟᴇᴄᴛᴜᴀʟ Pʀᴏᴘᴇʀᴛʏ Tʀᴀɴsᴀᴄᴛɪᴏɴs, 9 Duke J. Comp.
& Int'l L. 11, 35, 38-39. (1998))
28
Id.
29
Goldstein, supra note 7 at 4.
30
Id. at 5.
31
See Rojadirecta, Rojadirecta TV (last visited on Sept. 22, 2016),
available at http://www.rojadirecta.tv.
32
Enigmax, Streaming and Bittorrent Sports Links Site Declared Legal,
Torrentfreak (Jul. 24, 2009), available at https://torrentfreak.com/streamingand-bittorrent-sports-links-site-declared-legal-090724.
33
Ernesto, Sports Streaming / Torrent Link Site Victorious in Court,
Torrentfreak (May 10, 2010), available at https://torrentfreak.com/sportsstreaming-torrent-links-site-victorious-in-court-100510.
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domains belonging to Puerto 80: rojadirecta.com and
rojadirecta.org. The district court held that the domain names were
subject to forfeiture because they had been used to commit
criminal violations of copyright law by providing links to streams
of sporting events taking place in the United States.34 Following
the seizure, Puerto 80 successfully petitioned the U.S. government
to return the domains in 2012.35 The legal dispute continued into
June 2015, when the District Court of Madrid approved a
complaint from the Spanish Professional Football League (“LFP”)
and ruled that Puerto 80 was prohibited from linking to
unauthorized streams of football events to which the corporations
“Mediapro” and “Gol Television” owned the rights.36
Given the discrepancy in verdicts between the United
States and Spain with regard to Rojadirecta’s services, it is not
surprising that there is no international consensus as to what
exactly constitutes copyright infringement.
C. International Copyright Enforcement: Quo Vadis?
If two member countries disagree on whether an online
service based in one country violates copyright law, the minimum
protection standards of the Berne Convention and the enforcement
provisions in TRIPS become highly ineffective.37 Even if matters
rise to a government-to-government level, findings of noncompliance in a TRIPS dispute settlement can only be enforced
through international trade relations by denying other trade

34

Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. v. United States of America and, Department
of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 11 Civ. 3983
(S.D. N.Y. 2011).
35
Julie Samuels, Rojadirecta: The Government Reverses Course and
Returns Domain without Explanation. Again, Electronic Frontier Foundation
(Aug. 29, 2012), available at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/08/rojadirectagovernment-reverses-course-and-returns-domains-without-explanation.
36
Ernesto, Court Forbids Rojadirecta to Stream Football, or else…,
Torrentfreak (Jun. 23, 2015), available at https://torrentfreak.com/court-forbidsrojadirecta-to-stream-football-or-else-150623.
37
See Belleville, supra note 9 at 331.
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benefits in retaliation.38 In a statement before the Subcommittee on
Intellectual Property regarding international piracy, former United
States Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters concluded that:
“The TRIPS agreement has been a tremendously valuable tool
in advancing the development of legal structures to support
enforcement of copyright around the world. […] Despite all these
accomplishments, the fact remains that copyright enforcement in
too many countries around the world is extremely lax, allowing
staggeringly high piracy rates. . . .”39
In recognition of the fact that the current framework under
Berne and TRIPS had not been sufficiently developed to provide
an appropriate solution to online copyright enforcement, the
United States and Japan began discussions on a new multilateral
treaty to combat counterfeiting and piracy in 2006.40 The resulting
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”), however, was
dealt a serious blow when the European Parliament made use of its
Lisbon Treaty power to reject international trade agreements and
voted against ACTA in July 2012 by 478 to 39 votes.41 To this
day, Japan is the only country that has formally approved the
treaty.42
The United States has subsequently focused its efforts on
38

See generally Taubman, supra note 22.
U.S. Copyright Office, Statement of Marybeth Peters Before the
Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary, United
States Senate, 109th Congress, 1st Session (2005), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat052505.html.
40
Office of the United States Trade Representative, ACTA - Summary of
Key Elements under Discussion (2009), available at https://ustr.gov/aboutus/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2009/november/acta-summary-keyelements-under-discussion.
41
European Parliament Press Release, European Parliament rejects ACTA
(Jul. 4, 2012), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/newsroom/20120703IPR48247/European-Parliament-rejects-ACTA.
42
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Conclusion of the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) by Japan (Oct. 5, 2012), available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/acta_conclusion_1210.html.
39
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two other multinational agreements, both with significant potential
to influence the international IP protection standard: the TransPacific Partnership43 (“TPP”)—signed on February 2016 in
Auckland—and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership44 (“T-TIP”) with the European Union, which is still in
negotiations.
Although these two agreements may rectify certain
deficiencies in intellectual property enforcement, they are unlikely
to bring online copyright infringement to a halt. The main issue
with regard to online copyright enforcement is that index services,
such as Rojadirecta, can easily escape jurisdiction by moving their
domains to other countries, essentially playing a “whack-a-mole
game” with both domestic and international law enforcement
agencies, in which the index services always stay one step ahead.45
In light of the Berne Convention’s weaknesses, the key to a
successful international online copyright enforcement system in
the future is to ensure that all countries follow the same principles.
While such harmonization cannot be achieved by pushing
countries into signing multinational treaties, the copyright-based
industries in the Unites States have illustrated that lobbying efforts
on a domestic level can be highly effective.
II.

PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND THE SOPA / PIPA PROTESTS
A. Copyright Lawmaking in the United States

Over the past two centuries, copyright protection in the
United States has grown significantly. When the first Federal
Copyright Act of 1790 was enacted, it granted the rights to
43

Office of the United States Trade Representative, Trans-Pacific
Partnership Minister’s Statement (Feb. 4, 2016), available at
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2016/February/TPP-Ministers-Statement.
44
Office of the United States Trade Representative, Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), available at https://ustr.gov/ttip.
45
See Peter W. Singer, Allan Friedman, Cʏʙᴇʀsᴇᴄᴜʀɪᴛʏ ᴀɴᴅ Cʏʙᴇʀᴡᴀʀ:
Wʜᴀᴛ Eᴠᴇʀʏᴏɴᴇ Nᴇᴇᴅs ᴛᴏ Kɴᴏᴡ 194 (2008).
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reproduce and distribute any map, chart, or book to its respective
author for fourteen years.46 A renewal term of fourteen additional
years could be obtained, provided that the author survived
throughout the first term.47 Each new version of the Copyright Act
since the 1790 Act has provided longer, broader, and more
powerful protections.48 Today, the Copyright Act provides that
copyright protection subsists in all original works of authorship
fixed in tangible mediums of expression, including sound
recordings, audiovisual works, and architectural works.49 In
addition, the copyright term has been extended to the life of the
author plus seventy years, 50 and the initial exclusive rights have
been expanded by the rights of derivative works, public
performance, and public display.51
In recent decades, many intellectual property scholars have
applied public choice theory to explain this continuous copyright
expansion, pointing out the enormous influence of corporate right
holders over the legislative process.52 Generally speaking, public
choice theory suggests that well-organized groups with substantial
resources and clearly defined interests tend to have proportionally
greater political influence than the public at large.53 According to
modern public choice theory, also referred to as interest group
theory, legislation is considered “a good demanded and supplied
much [like] other goods.”54 Legislators are primarily motivated by
their interest to be reelected, whereas interest groups hold useful
political resources, such as financial support, public exposure, and
46

See William F. Patry, Cᴏᴘʏʀɪɢʜᴛ Lᴀᴡ ᴀɴᴅ Pʀᴀᴄᴛɪᴄᴇ, Ch. 1 (2014).
See id.
48
See Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory
Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 741 (Spring,
2001).
49
Copyright Act of 1976 § 101, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990).
50
Id. §§ 302 (1998).
51
Id. §§ 106 (2012).
52
See Lev-Aretz, supra note 14 at 213.
53
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reputation.55 As a consequence, legislators are tempted not only to
use their voting privileges to garner support from influential
interest groups, but also to avoid choices that may provoke
opposition from those groups.56
Since copyright law creates enforceable rights for private
parties, its legislation naturally attracts significant lobbying.57
While corporations may commonly seek advantages that solidify
and advance their market position, it is important to note that this
method of aiming for political influence is not necessarily
malicious or illegal.58 The problem is that the interests of lobbying
entities are often opposed to the interests of the general public.59
Thus, in order to protect public interest in copyright policymaking,
it is essential that the commercially-driven proposals of the
copyright-based industries are counterbalanced.60 This democratic
objective can only be achieved if all interested parties are properly
represented in the legislative process.61 Like most legislation in the
United States, however, copyright legislation presents a severe
collective action problem that consists of two parts.62 As economist
and social scientist Mancur Olson illustrated, groups that try to
obtain collective benefits for a large and diffuse body of people are
unlikely to form in the first place.63 Olson argues that even in the
improbable event that a large number of individuals manages to
successfully form a group representing the interests of a diffuse
55
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body of people, issues with collective action—particularly
information costs and organization costs—are likely to inhibit the
group’s political activity.64
As applied to the federal legislative process, Olson’s
theories certainly help in understanding the development of
copyright law and policy in the United States. In Digital
Copyright, Jessica Litman offers a comprehensive historical review
of the copyright legislative process in the United States that goes
back to the enactment of the 1909 Copyright Act.65 The 1909
Copyright Act was born out of conferences conveyed by the
Librarian of Congress, which only representatives of interest
groups attended.66 When uninvited parties expressed their
disapproval of the drafted bill, the representative of the affected
parties conducted negotiations and agreed on a revised draft that
was promptly enacted by Congress.67 Like their predecessors, the
drafters of the 1976 Copyright Act depended on negotiations
among representatives of a variety of interests affected by
copyright, in order to draft a copyright bill.68 As a result, expansive
rights were balanced by narrow exceptions.69 When the bill finally
emerged from the conferences, it “enlarged the copyright pie and
divided its pieces among conference participants so that no
leftovers remained.”70
The enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
was based on the same multilateral, interindustry negotiation, but
was “extended to the point of self-parody”, with copyright owners
securing new rights designed to prevent the discovery of loopholes,
and diverse powerful players being granted detailed exceptions.71
The only interest groups that had not yet made a deal was the
drafters were the libraries, universities and schools, and civil
64
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liberties and consumer organizations.72 Consequently, the
“internally inconsistent” Digital Millennium Copyright Act did not
only make non-commercial and non-infringing behavior illegal,
but also imposed liability on ordinary citizens for violating
provisions they had no reason to suspect are part of the law.73
Ultimately, Litman argues, the copyright laws of the United States
“have not been written by Congress or Congressional staffers, not
by the Copyright Office or any public servant in the executive
branch, but rather by copyright lobbyists.”74
Irrespective of whether the public choice argument applies,
the fact remains that the copyright-based industries in the United
States have had a strong and lasting influence in drafting copyright
legislation.75 The general public, on the other hand, has historically
been insufficiently organized to effectively assert its interest, even
if some lobbying groups such as library associations may claim to
represent some aspects of the public interest.76 After decades of
successful copyright amendments, however, the so far wellfunctioning strategy of extending legal protection was put to an
unexpected end when Congress set out to enact the copyright
lobbyists’ most recent proposal: the Stop Online Piracy Act.
B. The Stop Online Piracy Act
In October 2011, Representative Lamar Smith from Texas
introduced SOPA in the House of Representatives, attempting to
combat the unsolved problem of rampant online copyright
infringement by restricting access to domestic and foreign websites
that host or facilitate the trading of pirated content.77 With respect
to its key provisions, SOPA strongly related to its Senate
72
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athttp://money.cnn.com/2012/01/17/technology/sopa_explained.
73

18

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[VOL. 12:1

counterpart, the Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic
Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act (“PIPA”), which
Senator Patrick Leahy introduced in March 2011.78
PIPA and SOPA were never signed into law, despite broad
initial support in both chambers, as their highly controversial
provisions created an enormous public outcry over questions of
free speech and fair use.79 On January 18, 2012, more than one
hundred thousand websites and blogs participated in an
orchestrated online protest against the bills, which gave them
widespread and unforeseen coverage in the media.80 Internet users
protested against the bills by posting and tweeting on social media,
signing online petitions, sending emails, and making millions of
phone calls to their representatives.81 In view of this overwhelming
opposition, more and more lawmakers started to dissociate from
the bills. While on the morning of the SOPA strike only 31
members of Congress opposed the legislation, the number rose to
142 after the publicized backlash.82 Two days after the strike,
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid announced on Twitter that he
had decided to postpone the planned vote on PIPA “in light of
recent events”.83 A few hours later, Representative Lamar Smith
indefinitely postponed the House discussion of SOPA until there
was a “wider agreement on a solution.”84
78
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C. The Reasons Behind SOPA’s Failure
In order to understand the failure of SOPA and PIPA, it is
important to contextualize the way in which Congress attempted to
solve the problem of online copyright infringement. Faced with the
problems caused by online services such as Rojadirecta, the Senate
created PIPA to target foreign websites that infringed upon U.S.
copyrights but were difficult to bring to justice under U.S.
jurisdiction.85 To achieve this goal, the bill proposed to grant the
ability to bring an action against any foreign website to the holder
of an infringed intellectual property right, provided that the holder
can show that the targeted website has a connection to the United
States. The holder could subsequently obtain an injunction that
would cut the website off from consumers in the United States by
redirecting its domain name and filtering its domain name from
search engines.86 The simplicity of this approach might appear
convincing on first sight; however, later opinions and
commentaries from the legal and technical community raised the
question of whether Congress really understood its implications.87
Following PIPA’s introduction, a group of 108 law
professors submitted a joint letter to Congress, arguing that PIPA
would be unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds, create
several technical consequences affecting the security of the
Internet address system, and undermine U.S. foreign policy.88
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sopa-bill-shelved-afterglobal-protests-from-google-wikipedia-andothers/2012/01/20/gIQAN5JdEQ_story.html.
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Several members of the technical community also opposed the bill,
raising concerns about a number of technical issues that the bill
would create.89 These members argued that the proposed domain
name filtering system would not only produce significant collateral
damage by preventing users from accessing web sites that were not
intended to be filtered, but that changes in the operation of the
domain name system (“DNS”) would create security risks for
individual users, banks, credit card web sites, and health care
providers.90 In accordance with these concerns, a group of 83
computer and network engineers who described themselves as a
“who’s-who of the proud geeks who built the modern Internet”
wrote an open letter to Congress, warning that compliance with
SOPA’s and PIPA’s provisions would have “capricious technical
consequences” for the global DNS and its security and stability.91
In reaction to these critical voices, Rep. Lamar Smith
announced three days prior to the blackout that he would remove
the provisions in SOPA that required Internet service providers
(“ISPs”) to block access to foreign websites accused of piracy.92
This late attempt to calm the waves was insufficient to prevent the
announced protests. In hindsight, however, this last-minute
compromise proposal to save the bill clearly demonstrates the
significance of including professional expertise in the lawmaking
process as early as possible. In her article regarding the influence
of SOPA’s failure on policymaking, Annemarie Bridy rightly
States Senate Legislation & Records (July 5, 2011), available at
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Law%20Professor%20Letter%20July%202011.pdf.
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argued that the only people in a position to deliver the “best
available information and arguments” about the technical
implications and consequences of DNS blocking were “the
nerds.”93 In spite of this obvious conclusion, however, not a single
technical expert was invited to the debate or to testify at the House
Judiciary Committee hearing on SOPA.94 While representatives of
Pfizer and the MPAA testified on behalf of intellectual property
right-holders, and representatives of Google and MasterCard
testified on behalf of the online intermediaries whose business
practices the bill sought to regulate, there was nobody to testify on
behalf of the average consumer or the technical community.95 One
of the few people aware of the dimension of this problem was
Representative Jason Chaffetz, who illustrated to his colleagues
that they were preparing to make Internet policy without any actual
understanding of the technical consequences:
“I was trying to think of a way to describe my concerns with
this bill, but basically we are going to do surgery on the
Internet, and we haven’t had a doctor in the room tell us how
we[‘re] going to change these organs. We are basically going
to reconfigure the Internet and how it is going to work without
bringing in the nerds, without bringing in the doctors.”96
Admittedly, the official exclusion of the Internet engineers
did not stop them from talking back to the legislature by using the
channels open to them.97 It is also difficult to say whether the
93
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uninvited testimony of the technical community was a decisive
factor in SOPA’s defeat.98 Regardless of the actual impact,
however, it seems fair to argue that including the Internet
engineers in the bill’s deliberations—and so excluding the DNS
provisions from the bill—would not only have allowed Congress
to better understand SOPA’s implications, but would have
decreased the risk of creating such fierce opposition in the first
place.
D. Seeking a Democratically Legitimate Solution
Following the overwhelming success of the SOPA protest,
many commentators were full of hope for a better and more
balanced copyright regime, going so far as to designate the SOPA
strike the beginning of a “new era of political engagement based
on social media.”99 But while social networks may have
empowered individuals to become more active in the political
process, multiple factors suggest that protests along the lines of
SOPA are unlikely to reduce the excessive influence of lobbyists
and other special interest groups in the legislative process.100
A primary reason is that public participation—as seen in
the SOPA and PIPA Internet blackouts—depends on the
availability of a stimulator that provides the required information
about the legislative activity and further coordinates the opposition
against it. This tedious and time-consuming function is only
voluntarily assumed by individuals or groups who fear a specific
proposal; the general public cannot rely on being informed and
agitated every time a bill threatens to compromise one of their
interests.
Secondly, even if the success of the SOPA protests could
be repeated on a regular basis, this would give the general public
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the ability to stop, but not to proactively shape new legislation.101
Such destructive power creates an evident problem: if the public
starts to prevent one unpopular bill after another, Congress might
decide to rely on alternative methods: including unpopular
legislative proposals in so-called omnibus bills, for example, which
cover a variety of unrelated topics and make the individual
proposal immune from any form of democratic control.
The Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act
(“CISPA”) provides a good example for the concerns mentioned
above. Initially introduced in the House in November 2011, CISPA
was intended to facilitate government investigations of cyber
threats and to safeguard the security of networks against cyberattacks.102 Although advocates of Internet piracy and civil liberties
strongly opposed CISPA,103 their attempts to invoke the success of
the SOPA protests did not bear fruit.104 The opposition had fewer
participants, enjoyed less media coverage, and ultimately did not
succeed in preventing the House from voting on the bill.105 Despite
President Obama’s threat to veto, the House passed CISPA by a
vote of 248-168.106 Only later did the bill fail in the Senate.107
When the House reintroduced the bill in 2013, the Senate did not
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even look at it, and CISPA died once more.108 On March 17, 2015,
however, a similar bill—known as the Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Act (“CISA”)—was introduced in the Senate, and passed
on October 27, 2015.109 Due to the White House’s expressed
support for the bill, CISA was on its way towards becoming law.110
But facing a potential government shutdown, legislators started to
confer on a new version of the cybersecurity bill and included it in
a $1.1 trillion federal government spending bill which consisted of
more than 2,000 pages.111 By including CISA in the “Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2016”112 which secured governmental funding
through the next fiscal year, the introduction of the bill became a
mere matter of form—even though digital rights groups had urged
the Obama administration to veto the legislation.113 This approach,
however, stripped the final bill of various meaningful privacy
protections that were included in the Senate’s original version of
CISA.114 More importantly, omnibus legislation requires a strong
108
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presumption that few members of Congress would actually take
the time to read and scrutinize the provisions it contains. When
Sen. Rand Paul was asked why he voted against the spending bill,
he stated what many were thinking:
“It was over a trillion dollars, it was all lumped
together, 2,242 pages. Nobody read it, so, frankly,
my biggest complaint is that I have no idea what
kind of things they stuck in the bill. […] We were
given it yesterday or the day before the bill came
forward, and so this is not a way to run government.
It’s a part of the reason why government is
broke.”115
On their face, the events surrounding the SOPA protests in
2012 primarily demonstrated that the general public in the United
States demands a right to participate in the future development of
copyright legislation. From a legal point of view, however,
SOPA’s failure predominantly shows an unequivocal need for
procedural control over the federal law-making process in general.
As shown above, Congress has restricted the right to participate in
the legislative process to specific special interest groups. In so
doing, Congress thus may arbitrarily exclude other participants
affected just as much by the legislative proposal.
While public protests might serve as a means of last resort
to stop a legislative project, the lack of public control over the
federal law-making process begs an important question: what
could the United States do to allow the general public to participate
in a more constructive way? In the following section, this Article
will analyze the current legal situation in Switzerland and
introduce a legislative process that might present a potentially
feasible solution for the problems raised above.
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COPYRIGHT LAW AND SWISS DEMOCRACY
A. The History of Copyright Law in Switzerland

Despite its relatively small size, Switzerland has played a
significant role in the development of international intellectual
property law. Not only was Switzerland host to the Berne
Convention—adopted in 1886—it is also currently home to the
World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), which
maintains its headquarters in Geneva.116 Despite the country’s
prominent role with international organizations, however, there is
probably no area of civil law in Switzerland in which the notion of
justice is as underdeveloped as in that of copyright.117
While European countries like England, France, and the
historic state of Prussia adopted copyright laws in the early 19th
century, Switzerland only enacted its first Federal Copyright Act in
1883, a mere three years before the Berne Convention passed.118
Prior to its enactment, several Swiss cantons—the member states
of the Swiss Confederation, equivalent to the states in the U.S.—
wholly resisted the recognition of intellectual property, primarily
because the supply of neighboring countries with unlicensed works
was seen as a profitable business.119 In spite of this, Switzerland
played an important role in the Berne Conference, and the Swiss
Federal Council was given the mandate of writing the draft
convention.120 After the foundation of the ‘Berne Union’, however,
Switzerland gradually passed over the role of copyright guide to
116
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other states. Scholars have attributed the decision to the somewhat
arid nature of the subject for a country with a direct democracy,
but also to the development of law which took place more rapidly
in centralized countries.121
When the 1883 Swiss Copyright Act was first amended in
1922, it employed the same language as the revised Berne
Convention, affording authors fair and efficient protection for a
fixed term of thirty years.122 In the decades that followed, Swiss
copyright legislation continued to align itself with neighboring
countries on the scope of its copyrights and refrained from
including new ideas or original formulae that might have served as
models for broadening the Berne Convention.123 This strategy of
mere international compliance ended in June 1989, when the Swiss
Federal Council signed off on a complete revision of the Copyright
Act with the intention to adapt copyright law to the economic and
technological developments that had taken place since 1922.124
The current Copyright Act of Switzerland was enacted on
January 1, 1993; it has been amended seven times, most recently
on January 1, 2011. One of the most controversial changes of the
1993 Copyright Act was the introduction of a broad statutory
private use exception.125 Article 19 of the Swiss Copyright Act126
(“CopA”) currently states that published works, with the exception
of computer programs, may be used for any personal use, copied,
and shared within a circle of persons closely connected to each
other, such as relatives or friends.127 In line with prevailing legal
121
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opinion, the legislator who introduced this exception clarified in
2006 that ‘private use’ included the right to download audiovisual
works from the Internet,128 regardless of whether the file has been
downloaded from a legal or illegal source.129
Because of its broad application, the private use exception
has been met with harsh criticism from copyright-based industry
representatives such as the IIPA.130 It is important to note,
however, that the private use exception does not include a right to
use a work outside of the private sphere. This caveat has a large
impact on the private use doctrine. While downloading a
copyrighted work from an illegal source—with the exception of
computer programs—may not constitute copyright infringement,
Internet users in Switzerland are not allowed to upload or share
downloaded, purchased, or otherwise acquired copies with the
public.
The Swiss Copyright Act grants authors not only the
exclusive rights to copy and to distribute, but the additional right to
make the work perceptible.131 Through this right, the Swiss
Copyright Act affords more protection than its U.S. counterpart.
Although some U.S. copyright owners have attempted to judicially
create a so-called “making available” right based on the right to
distribute, the prevailing doctrine holds that the mere offer to
distribute a copyrighted work does not violate section 106(3) of the
Copyright Act.132
This broad set of exclusive rights gives Swiss law
enforcement agencies the opportunity to take strong action against
online copyright infringement. Despite the widespread use of filesharing services in the country, however, it was not until early
2010 that the first case of online copyright infringement in
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Botschaft zum Bundesbeschluss über die Genehmigung von zwei
Abkommen der Weltorganisation für geistiges Eigentum und zur Änderung des
Urheberrechtsgesetzes, BBl 3430 (2006).
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IIPA, supra note 5.
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Switzerland became public.133 In a historical precedent, an 18year-old student from Bellinzona was found guilty of up- and
downloading approximately 4200 copyrighted musical works and
270 movies, convicted of criminal copyright infringement, and
sentenced to 30 days in jail on parole and a penalty of 400 Swiss
Francs. Notwithstanding the comparatively mild monetary
sentence, the case was heavily criticized for its lack of
proportionality.134 Approximately one year later, the Federal
Supreme Court of Switzerland ruled that providing hash-links to an
illegal file-sharing arrangement on a website may constitute
copyright infringement, regardless of whether the provider of the
link participates in the actual file-sharing process.135 After a
detailed scrutiny of the technical procedure, the court reasoned that
providing hash links to copyrighted material violates the author’s
right to make the work perceptible, since visitors can start the
download process simply by clicking on the link in question.136
Since most file-sharing services were, and still are, based
on concurrent downloading and uploading of a single file, these
two decisions seemed to render the private use exception
inapplicable with regard to downloading copyrighted works from
the Internet. Further, taking legal action against copyright
infringers became even easier when companies like Logistep AG
from Switzerland started to offer their services to copyright owners
by de-anonymizing users of file-sharing services. However, the
anticipated flood of lawsuits and cease-and-desist orders ultimately
came to a halt before it started.
133

Paolo Attivissimo, Svizzera, condanna per file sharing, Il
Disinformatico (Jan. 2, 2010), available at
http://attivissimo.blogspot.com/2010/01/svizzera-condanna-per-filesharing.html.
134
Julia Klein, Filesharing in der Schweiz übertrieben bestraft, Gulli (Jan.
8, 2010), available at http://www.gulli.com/news/12144-filesharing-in-derschweiz-uebertrieben-bestraft-2010-01-08.
135
Bundesgericht [BGer] Feb. 7, 2011, 6B_757/2010.
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Id. (The court further reasoned that even if the file-sharing client is not
pre-installed on the computer, then the hash-link leads to another website which
allows the Internet user to download the file-sharing client needed to perform
the file-sharing process.)
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B. The Logistep Decision
1. The Federal Administrative Court’s Ruling in 2009
In May 2008, the Federal Data Protection and Information
Commissioner of Switzerland (“Federal Commissioner”) brought
suit against the Swiss company Logistep AG before the Federal
Administrative Court.137 Logistep AG was in the business of
collecting information about users of peer-to-peer (P2P) filesharing services who shared copyrighted content for download via
the service’s networks.138 The information was obtained by
Logistep’s software File Sharing Monitor.139 File Sharing Monitor
acted like any other P2P-Client, with the exception that the
Monitor had been programmed to prevent the subsequent upload of
downloaded information.140
Whenever the Monitor found a copyrighted work, it
automatically initiated a download and recorded information such
as: the Internet Protocol address (“IP address”) of the user offering
the copyrighted file; the user’s P2P username; the name of the P2P
network; the name and hash code of the network; and the date and
time of the download.141 Logistep supplied this information to its
clients in order to assist them in identifying copyright infringers.142
Copyright owners would then use the infringer’s IP address to file
criminal charges against persons unknown, identify the infringing
individuals after obtaining access to the criminal files, and use the
information to seek damages through a civil lawsuit.143
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a. The Federal Data Protection Act Applies to IP Addresses
Since the case was brought by the Federal Commissioner,
the Federal Administrative Court first needed to consider whether
the Federal Act on Data Protection144 (“FADP”) applied under the
circumstances.145 In particular, since the identification of the users
was enabled by collecting their IP addresses, the court had to
assess whether IP addresses constituted personal data within the
meaning of Article 3(a) of the FADP.146
Albeit Switzerland is not part of the European Union
(“EU”), the lack of precedent prompted the court to refer to
comparative legal analysis and look at the legal situation in the EU,
where the Article 29 Working Group147 had recently concluded
that static IP addresses constitute personal data because they refer
to an identifiable individual.148 The court adopted this view and
noted that dynamic IP addresses become equally identifying as
soon as criminal charges are filed.149 As a consequence, the court
concluded that all IP addresses are personal data within the
FADP’s meaning.150
The court further held that Logistep processed the personal
data within the meaning of Article 3(e) of the FADP,151 reasoning
144

Bundesgesetz über den Datenschutz [DSG], Loi fédérale sur la
protection des données [LPD], Legge federale sulla protezione die dati [LPD]
[Federal Act on Data Protection], Jun. 19, 1992, SR 235.1 (Switz.).
145
BVGer supra note 137, at 1.2.
146
Article 3(a) of the FADP holds that personal data is all information
relating to an identified or identifiable person.
147
Article 29 of the Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.
148
BVGer supra note 137, at 2.2.3.
149
Id. at 2.2.4. Once criminal charges are filed, the law enforcement
agencies can request Internet Service Providers to determine which user has
been assigned the IP address at the time of the infringement.
150
Id.
151
According to Article 3(e) of the FADP, processing means “any
operation with personal data, irrespective of the means applied and the
procedure, and in particular the collection, storage, use, revision, disclosure,
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that Logistep’s File Sharing Monitor collected, saved, and
transferred information that qualifies as personal data.152 The court
did not follow Logistep’s argument against FADP’s applicability
based on the allegation that all identified IP addresses and
copyright owners were domiciled abroad.153 Rather, the court held
that the Act does not contain any provisions regarding its territorial
applicability, and that the subsidiary principle of territoriality
makes the Act applicable whenever processing of personal data
takes place in Switzerland.154
b. Logistep’s Data Collection Constitutes a Breach of Privacy
In the main part of the decision, the court assessed whether
the processing of personal data by Logistep amounted to a breach
of privacy. FADP’s breach of privacy provision states in general
that anyone who processes personal data must not unlawfully
breach the privacy of the data subjects in doing so.155 Further,
Article 12(2) of the Act holds that data processors must not process
personal data, except if in accordance with the general principles
of Articles 4, 5(1), and 7(1), and must not process data pertaining
to a person against that person’s express wish without justification.
However, Article 12(3) clarifies that there is no breach of privacy
if the data subject has made the data generally accessible and has
not expressly prohibited its processing.
The court disregarded Logistep’s argument that IP
addresses in P2P networks are generally accessible, holding that
“even if the Internet could be qualified as an open space […] its
usage does not mean that personal data should be made accessible
to all Internet users without further ado. […] IP addresses are
normally not knowingly communicated, especially not for the
purpose of having them processed by third parties.”
The court continued by looking at the general data
archiving or destruction of data.”
152
BVGer supra note 137, at 2.3.3.
153
Id. at 4.1.
154
Id. at 4.2.
155
See FADP, art. 12(1).
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protection principles contained in Article 4, focusing on the act’s
principles of lawfulness, good faith, transparency, and
expediency.156 Based on the principle of lawfulness, the court held
that Switzerland does not have a statutory basis which regulates the
gathering and transfer of personal data in P2P networks, and
concluded that this type of data collection is not expressly
forbidden.157 Following this conclusion, the court held that the
principles of good faith and transparency are of particular
importance in the context of data collection, and highlighted that
personal data should not be processed if the affected person cannot
expect such proceedings.158 Since Logistep collects personal data
without the knowledge of the affected individuals, the court
followed the Federal Commissioner’s reasoning and held that
Logistep violated the principle of transparency.159 With regard to
the principle of good faith, on the other hand, the court indicated
that Logistep only collects personal data of P2P users who are
assumed to be guilty of criminal copyright infringement.160 Since
the current legal framework does not offer copyright owners
alternative solutions to enforce their rights, and copyright owners
cannot be expected to silently tolerate violations of their statutory
rights, the court held that Logistep’s collection of personal data
does not constitute a violation of the principle of good faith.161
Lastly, the court found a violation of the principle of expediency,
reasoning that Logistep’s method does not communicate the
purpose of proceedings to the affected individual, mainly because
156

These principles are contained in Articles 4(1)-(4) of the FADP, holding
that (1) personal data may only be processed lawfully; that (2) the processing of
personal data must be carried out in good faith; that (3) personal data may only
be processed for the purpose indicated at the time of collection, that is evident
from the circumstances, or that is provided for by law; and (4) that the collection
of personal data and in particular the purpose of its processing must be evident
to the data subject.
157
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such information would render any investigation impossible.162
c. Logistep’s Breach of Privacy is Justified
After holding that Logistep collected personal data in
violation of the principles of transparency and expediency,163 the
court yet had to determine whether the resulting breach of privacy
was illegitimate.
According to Article 13(1) of the FADP, a breach of
privacy is unlawful unless consented to by the injured party, or
justified by an overriding private or public interest or by law.
Holding that there is no consent of the injured party and no
statutory rule that would justify the injury by law, the court
assessed whether Logistep’s collection of private data could be
justified by an overriding private or public interest. 164 In an
introductory note to its justification analysis, the court recalled that
copyright is an absolute right pertaining to the system of property
ownership and, as such, is afforded protection under the Federal
Constitution of Switzerland.165 Thus, once copyright owners’
property rights have been violated, the owners need to be able to
defend their rights, which requires knowledge of the infringer’s
identity. Logistep’s collection of personal data would likely help in
enforcing copyrights against infringers; without collecting their IP
addresses, it would be impossible to identify the violators and to
seek damages and injunctive relief against them.166 Balancing the
copyright owners’ interests with the FADP’s privacy principles,
the court noted that “the interference with the affected person’s
personal rights does not seem very serious. If the accusations are
not substantiated to a sufficient degree, criminal proceedings—
albeit they may cause some hardship—would be abandoned, and
correlating civil claims would be considered unjustified.”167
162
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Id. at 11.4.
164
Id. at 12.3.
165
Id. at 12.3.2.
166
Id. at 12.3.2.
167
Id. at 12.3.2
163

2016] INFLUENCE OF INTEREST GROUPS ON COPYRIGHT LAW AND POLICY 35

Based on this rationale, the court concluded that Logistep’s
collection of personal data was justified by an overriding private
and public interest as defined by Article 13 of the FADP and
therefore decided to dismiss the case against Logistep AG.168
2. The Federal Supreme Court’s Decision in 2010
The Federal Data Commissioner subsequently appealed the
Federal Administrative Court’s ruling to the Federal Supreme
Court. In his appellate brief, the Commissioner argued that the text
of Article 12(2) prohibits the court from taking the justifications in
Article 13 into account, if, as in this case, one of the general data
protection principles has been violated.169 The Federal
Commissioner warned that affirming the interpretation of the
Federal Administrative Court would significantly decrease the
level of data protection in Switzerland, because the question of
whether someone’s privacy has been violated would automatically
be reduced to whether a justification exists, regardless of the
respective tools that have been used by the data processor.170
In the first part of the decision, the Federal Supreme Court
confirmed that the IP addresses processed by Logistep qualified as
personal data within the meaning of Article 3(a) of the FADP, but
clarified at the same time that this finding did not rise to a general
rule.171 According to the statutory provision, IP addresses can only
qualify as personal data if they relate to an identified or identifiable
person.172 In the court’s opinion, finding such a relation would
require more than a mere possibility of identification and depends
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Ursula Sury, Beschwerdeschrift des EDÖB gegen Logistep AG 17 (Jan.
9, 2008), available at
http://www.edoeb.admin.ch/datenschutz/00628/00664/index.html?lang=de&do
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on the circumstances of the case.173 , Given that Logistep’s
business model was based on de-anonymizing users of file-sharing
services, however, the court concluded that the statutory
requirement of identifiability had been met.174 The Federal
Supreme Court further affirmed the holding that Logistep’s
collection of personal data violated the principles of transparency
and expediency and therefore constituted a breach of privacy.175
Regarding the applicability of the justifications in Article
13 of the FADP for violations of the general data protection
principles, the Supreme Court observed that the legislative history
was insufficiently instructive and that the relevant legal literature
tended to reveal partially divided opinions.176 Thus, the Federal
Supreme Court started its analysis by considering Article 13 of the
Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, which grants to
every person the right to privacy in their private and family life and
in their home, and in relation to their mail and telecommunications,
and the right to be protected against the misuse of their personal
data.177 Because this entitlement against misuse represents the core
of the FADP, the court cautioned that possible justifications should
only be applied with great restraint.178 After affirming the
Administrative Court’s finding that an overriding private or public
interest was the only eligible justification in the case, the Supreme
Court held that Logistep’s interest was purely economic, seeking
remuneration for an activity that—due to the lack of a statutory
basis—could lead to great uncertainties with regard to the proper
procedure and the proper scope of collecting and processing
personal data in the Internet.179 Reluctant to apply an overbroad
justification, the Federal Supreme Court thus decided that the
173
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public interest in effective suppression of online copyright
infringement would not compensate the uncertainties mentioned
above.180 The court’s most fundamental statement was expressed
in the final words of the decision:
“It shall be noted that this case only covers the
respondent’s method of data processing, and is not
intended to generally give priority to privacy law over
copyright law. It will be for the legislator, and not for
the judiciary, to take the appropriate steps to provide for
a system of copyright protection that conforms to the
new technologies.”181
Based on this unequivocal statement in support of a clear
separation of powers, the Federal Supreme Court vacated the
Federal Administrative Court’s decision and enjoined Logistep AG
from processing any personal data in P2P networks, and from
transferring already-collected data to the affected copyright
owners.182
C. The Impact of “Logistep” on Copyright Enforcement
1. The Legal Appreciation
The 2010 Supreme Court decision in Logistep became the
subject of a highly controversial debate. While some commentators
applauded the Supreme Court for increasing the pressure on the
legislature by clarifying that one infringement does not justify
another,183 others claimed that the decision might end up as a
pyrrhic victory for data protection, reasoning that such radical
points of view might turn data protection into offender

180

Id.
Id. at 6.4.
182
Id. at 7.
183
Marc Frédéric Schäfer & Elsa Dordi, Über die Rechtfertigung von
Persönlichkeitsverletzungen, Medialex 03/2011 142, 148.
181

38

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[VOL. 12:1

protection.184
For his part, the Federal Data Commissioner welcomed the
decision as a warning against the private sector’s increasing
tendency to take on certain tasks that must remain the prerogative
of the State.185 In particular, the Supreme Court had reproached
Logistep, not only for having taken advantage of the uncertainties
created by the company itself in order to demand excessive civil
damages, but for having done so before any copyright infringement
had been certified by a criminal court in a manner commensurate
with the requirements of the rule of law.186 The lack of prior
criminal adjudication had been the Commissioner’s main reason
for filing the complaint with the Federal Administrative Court;
during a presentation at the general meeting of SUISSIMAGE 187 in
2014, the Commissioner explained that he had conducted several
inquiries before filing the complaint against Logistep AG and
learned that the procedures adopted by other copyright holders in
pursuing alleged copyright infringement differed from the Logistep
case in this essential point.188 Further, he mentioned that the
umbrella organization IFPI Switzerland189 had always waited for a
184

David Rosenthal, Wenn Datenschutz übertrieben wird oder: Hard cases
make bad law, Jusletter (Sep. 27, 2010).
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The Federal Data Commissioner (FDPIC), Internet exchanges: decision
by the Federal Supreme Court, Annual Report 18 (2010/2011), available at
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g=en.
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The Federal Data Commissioner (FDPIC), Internet file-sharing
networks—the legal situation after the Logistep ruling, Annual Report 19
(2011/2012), available at
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g=en.
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Hanspeter Thür, Urheberrechtsverletzungen im Internet—Der Stand der
Dinge (Apr. 25, 2014), available at
http://www.suissimage.ch/fileadmin/content/pdf/9_News/Urheberrechtsverletzu
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definitive criminal conviction before suing copyright infringers for
damages in a civil court, which, in the Commissioner’s view, did
not constitute a violation of the Federal Data Protection Act.190
When IFPI Switzerland and the Swiss Anti-Piracy
Federation (“SAFE”) contacted the Commissioner after the
Logistep ruling, he advised them that a violation of privacy rights
as a result of data processing might still be justified, provided that
(1) the collection and recording of data does not go beyond what is
absolutely necessary to file a criminal complaint; that (2)
negotiations regarding claims for damages between the copyright
holders and the alleged infringers take place only if an enforceable
conviction had been pronounced by the courts (or on the alleged
infringers initiative); and that (3) the copyright holders must “step
up” their efforts to ensure that the collection of personal data and
the purpose of their processing is made as clear as possible to the
persons concerned.191 Following this statement, the Federal Data
Commissioner concluded that “under these conditions…copyright
infringers on the Internet may continue to be prosecuted in a
manner which respects data protection rules.”192
2. Non-Enforcement and Diplomatic Implications
Despite the Federal Data Commissioner’s legal assessment,
most law enforcement authorities in Switzerland interpreted the
Logistep decision very narrowly and refused to conduct further
investigations upon criminal copyright complaints, reasoning that
they would not have the legal basis to retrace the alleged
infringer’s IP addresses.193 This refusal was mainly based on the
Supreme Court’s deliberate silence as to whether the prosecution
2016), available at http://ifpi.org/about.php.
190
Thür, supra note 188.
191
See supra note 187.
192
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193
Ronny Nicolussi, Druckversuche der USA sind vorerst nicht
zielführend, Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Feb. 15, 2014), available at
http://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/druckversuche-der-usa-sind-vorerst-nichtzielfuehrend-1.18243844.
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authorities would still be allowed to make use of the information
obtained by Logistep in violation of the FADP.194
The fact that copyright owners in Switzerland were in
effect barred from enforcing their statutory rights against filesharers drew attention from the United States.195 An official report
was discreetly released on a sub-site of the Federal State
Secretariat for Economic Affairs (“SECO”) in February 2014,
which contained a summary of the confidential round table
between the SECO, the Embassy of the United States in Bern,
SAFE, Universal Music, and Walt Disney.196 According to the
report, the subject matter of copyright protection on the Internet
was brought to SECO’s attention by the U.S. Embassy in Bern
within the framework of the 2011 “Swiss-U.S. Trade and
Investment Cooperation Forum.”197 The roundtable’s declared
objective was to examine how copyright infringement on the
Internet could be determined and criminally pursued in compliance
with data protection laws.198 As a result of the round table’s
classified discussions, the participants set up a working group,
which subsequently set out to clarify the scope of the Logistep
decision by initiating a model case proceeding.199 IFPI Switzerland
subsequently filed criminal charges against an unknown file-sharer
in January 2013.200 Upon receipt of the complaint, the Public
Prosecution Department of the Canton of Zurich requested a user’s
identification based on the alleged infringer’s IP address, but
ultimately entered a nolle prosequi, reasoning that—because of the
Logistep decision—the obtained personal data would not be
admissible in any civil or criminal procedure due to privacy
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violations.201 IFPI appealed the nolle prosequi to the High Court of
the Canton of Zurich,202 which invalidated the Prosecutor’s
decision to dismiss the proceedings in its decision issued in
February 2014. The court acknowledged that the alleged
infringer’s IP address had been obtained unlawfully, but clarified
that Art. 141 of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code (“CrimPC”)—
which deals with the admissibility of unlawfully obtained
evidence—only applies to evidence obtained by law enforcement
agencies.203 The court also held that it was not sufficiently clear
whether unlawfully obtained evidence could be admissible if such
evidence was obtained by private parties.204 The court pointed out
that while criminal courts must follow the principle of leaving
doubt for the accused, prosecution authorities must adhere to the
principle that, in cases of doubt, criminal charges must always be
brought.205 Since criminal proceedings can only be abandoned if
the inadmissibility of the evidence is manifest, the court decided
that the question of admissibility must be decided in a criminal
proceeding by the criminal court, and remanded the case to the
Public Prosecution Department.206
Although the High Court of the Canton of Zurich
effectively greenlit criminal copyright enforcement in early 2014,
things remained surprisingly quiet after the model case proceeding.
One possible reason behind this may be that the legislature
eventually responded to the Federal Supreme Court’s request,207
and decided to examine the possibilities of a new legislative
201
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solution.
D. The Legislative Proposal
1. The AGUR12 Working Group
In August 2012, Federal Councillor Simonetta Sommaruga,
Head of the Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police,
invited several interested associations and administrative units to
cooperate in a working group on copyright modernization208 called
“AGUR12”. The Councillor instructed the group to identify
possibilities for adapting copyright law to recent technical
developments by the end of 2013.209 Of particular interest is the
fact that, unlike the group of invitees to the House Judiciary
Committee hearing on SOPA, AGUR12 was not merely comprised
of artists and industry representatives, but included several
members who represented the interests of users and consumers.210
In December 2013, AGUR12 published its final report and
recommended several measures to improve copyright protection on
the Internet, emphasizing that “while there is consensus regarding
the overall package, this is not always the case for individual
recommendations.”211 AGUR12 determined that copyright owners
should have the right to process Internet connection data for the
208

In full, the group was described as: a working group on the optimization
of the collective management of copyright and related rights; see supra note 5.
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210
The working group AGUR12 was comprised of six creative artist
representatives, three producer representatives, three user representatives, three
consumer representatives, and three representatives from the Federal
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Internet Service Providers did not directly participate in the discussion but were
consulted as technical experts. See AGUR12, supra note 209 at 6-7.
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purpose of investigating copyright infringement to enforce their
rights prior to notifying the connection’s owner.212 If the subscriber
of the Internet connection does not take action to prevent further
infringement upon notification, AGUR12 recommended that the
access provider should be obliged to disclose the identity of the
subscriber for the purpose of initiating civil proceedings.213
Although this recommendation would arguably be sufficient
to solve the problems raised by Logistep, AGUR12 did not hesitate
to propose regulations beyond the issue of initial identification. In
keeping with the demands of the copyright-based industries,
AGUR12 suggested the implementation of a “take down and stay
down” system, which would require host providers to not only take
down infringing material upon notice, but to take all reasonable
measures to prevent any further illegal uploading of such
content.214 AGUR12 also recommended blocking access to web
portals that feature obvious illegal sources by means of IP and
DNS blocking,215 a suggestion reminiscent of the dire provisions
included in the disfavored SOPA as discussed above.
In view of these proposals, the working group’s initial
recommendation that downloads from illegal sources should
remain legal216 provides little comfort from a user and Internet
community perspective. This raises an important question: how is
it possible that a working group that includes both user and
consumer representatives agree on such far-reaching regulations?
One possible answer came from the Internet community,
which—despite AGUR12’s self-portrayal as a broad conglomerate
of diverse interests—was denied the opportunity to participate in
the working group’s discussions.217 In reaction to their exclusion,
members of the Swiss network policy association Digitale Allmend
publicly criticized AGUR12’s final proposal, concluding that the
212
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so-called “consensus regarding the overall package” was in fact a
simple imposition of interests attributable to the right-owners’
numerical superiority.218 Well-known Swiss attorney Martin
Steiger, whose work focuses on information technology,
intellectual property, and media law, also criticized AGUR12’s
final proposal. In his view, an implementation of AGUR12’s
recommendations would not only lead to a comprehensive
monitoring of Internet use in Switzerland, but further allow the
United States’ entertainment industry and other rights holders to
exercise vigilante justice by recruiting Swiss providers as auxiliary
policemen.219
2. The 2015 Draft Bill
Despite this criticism, the Federal Council mandated in
June 2014 that the Department of Justice and Police (“FDJP”)
should prepare a draft bill by the end of 2015.220 The draft bill—
submitted in December 2015 and left open for public consultation
until March 31, 2016—mainly drew upon the recommendations of
AGUR12.221
In the first part of the draft bill, the proposed Article 62(a)
deals with the issue surrounding the Logistep decision (as
discussed in 4.3 supra), but limits the applicability of the provision
to cases of serious222 copyright infringement. Access providers
218
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should provide serious copyright infringers with two notifications
and inform them of the legal situation and the potential
consequences of non-compliance.223 If the users continue to
infringe copyright despite these notifications, the courts will be
authorized to disclose the offending user’s identity to allow the
copyright owner to initiate civil proceedings.224 Since criminal
proceedings would no longer be necessary to obtain the user’s
identity, the draft bill does not criminalize users of P2P networks,
particularly since the download for exclusive private use would
remain permitted.225
Although the proposed changes to Article 62(a) could
potentially solve the issue surrounding the Logistep decision, the
draft bill tries to combat piracy by implementing additional
measures “where they are most effective”—namely with providers
who can act quickly and in a targeted manner.226 As a result,
Article 66(b) includes a ‘takedown’ provision which resembles the
U.S. DMCA notice-and-takedown process, but expands the process
by a limited227 ‘stay down’ provision that requires service
providers to prevent the same or other protected works from being
made available on the same servers again. Furthermore,
subprovisions (d) through (f) of Articles 66 introduce an “access
block” provision, which enables copyright owners to request that
December 2015, the FDJP has not defined the term “large amount”, but has used
the example in which a user of P2P networks has offered around 13,000
different copyrighted songs. See generally Erläuternder Bericht zu zwei
Abkommen der Weltorganisation für geistiges Eigentum und zu Änderungen des
Urheberrechtsgesetzes, Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement (Dec.
11, 2015), available at
http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/dam/data/ejpd/aktuell/news/2015/2015-12-11/vn-berd.pdf (hereinafter “Explanatory Report”).
223
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46

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[VOL. 12:1

the Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property block access to
a foreign website, upon making a prima facie case that the website
in question mainly contains infringing material. Like the ‘stay
down’ provision in Article 66(b), the ‘access block’ provision
seeks a balance between copyright law, due process, and free
speech by allowing the affected foreign access provider to file a
written objection within 30 days, and clarifying that objections will
have a suspensory effect.
Although the FDJP mainly followed the recommendations
of AGUR12 and included a total of three new measures to combat
piracy, the draft bill tries not only to uphold the principle of
proportionality, but further limits the applicability of the provisions
to severe cases. Based on their conflicting interests, it is likely that
neither the Internet community nor the copyright-based industries
will be fully satisfied with the proposed compromise. Whether or
not the amended Copyright Act will ultimately include these
provisions, however, there are good reasons for the FDJP to steer a
middle course.
E. Direct Democracy vs. Public Choice
1. Direct Democracy—An Overview
As previously illustrated, legislative lobbying is not unique
to the United States. The vehemence with which copyright-based
industries are currently trying to influence the development of
Swiss copyright law is strongly reminiscent of the legislative
process in the United States described by Litman. However, owing
to the fact that Switzerland and the United States use vastly
different systems of democratic governance, the similarities end
where they begin.
At its beginning, the United States represented the only
fully functioning democracy in the Western world.228 Today, most
industrial countries have adopted a democratic model that allows
228
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citizens to participate in one way or another, and every continent
contains countries with this form of government.229 As the number
of democracies has grown, the “undemocratic” nature of the
United States governmental system—such as the inherent
prevention from electing Senators and electors for the Presidential
election—has become increasingly apparent.230 Although some of
these undemocratic elements have been removed from the system
over time, the federal government still lacks a key component of a
democracy: a system that allows the people to participate in the
legislative process directly.231 Despite its longstanding democratic
tradition, the United States remains one of the few democracies in
the world that has never held a federal referendum or mass
electorate vote on a public issue.232
By contrast, European countries have a long history of
referendums, both at the local and national level.233 This is
particularly true for Switzerland. Like most other Western
countries, Switzerland is a representative democracy in which
citizens with the right to vote elect public officials who effectively
represent the general public. But, unlike a majority of other
countries, Switzerland employs several direct democratic
instruments that allow the general public to intervene in the lawmaking process, not only on a federal level, but on all political
levels, including twenty-six sovereign cantons and more than 2,000
autonomous municipalities.234 A detailed discussion of all these
instruments would go beyond the scope of this Article; however,
229
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two direct democratic instruments play an important role in the
course of the ongoing revision of the Swiss Copyright Act: the
constitutional right to hold an optional referendum and the
statutory right to participate in the mandatory consultation
procedure.
2. The Optional Referendum
Although the vast majority of federal laws and legislative
acts in Switzerland enter into force without being contested in a
popular vote, every citizen who is eligible to vote has the
constitutional right to oppose any act of parliament by launching
an optional referendum.235 Article 141(a) of the Federal
Constitution of the Swiss Confederation states that any federal
act236 shall be submitted to a vote of the People if, within 100 days
of the official publication of the enactment, any 50,000 persons
eligible to vote—or any eight cantons—request it.
Since the adoption of the Federal Constitution in 1848,
Switzerland has held 180 optional referendums, in which a total of
102 legislative proposals were rejected by the voters.237 In the first
half of 2016, Switzerland held optional referendums against the
addition of a second tube to the existing Gotthard tunnel,238 the
235
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proposed revision of the Federal Asylum Act,239 and the proposed
revision of the Federal Act on Medically Assisted Reproduction,240
all of which were initiated by public interest groups but were
rejected by a clear majority of voting citizens.
As these examples suggest, the optional referendum is an
instrument primarily used to challenge legislative decisions
relating to highly controversial topics. Allowing the general public
an opportunity to voice their opinions in these often-emotional
questions is a core element in Swiss politics.
Despite their many advantages, however, optional
referenda are accompanied by at least two shortcomings. First, the
power of referenda is limited in the sense that they are able to
destroy, but not to generate, legislative proposals and solutions.
This problem is comparable to the SOPA protests. The opponents
of SOPA had a clear goal that was easy to deliver, and even easier
to follow by the general public: stop the bill.241 As demonstrated
by the ultimate success of the SOPA protests, preventing
legislation is much easier than enacting it.242 Further, as a result of
their accessibility, optional referenda can also be invoked by
smaller groups that might be perceived as controversial, which
suisse Confederazione Svizzera Confederaziun svizra (Feb. 28, 2016), available
at
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Confederazione Svizzera Confederaziun svizra (Jun. 5, 2016), available at
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html.
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requires the implementation of safeguards that prevent the optional
referendum from being abused and the legislative process from
being blocked by recurring challenges. This is where the
mandatory consultation procedure comes into play.
3. The Consultation Procedure
Despite broad direct-democratic opportunities to intervene
in the lawmaking process, only around seven percent of all federal
legislative decisions in Switzerland actually lead to a
referendum.243 The low ratio of legislative challenges is due to a
process that not only seeks parliamentary compromise, but reduces
the risk of referenda244 by incorporating into the process all
political forces within the country that are legally permitted and
capable of launching them.245
The incorporation of such forces happens primarily during
the pre-parliamentary phase of the legislative process, which is
divided into two stages. In the first stage, the Federal Council
nominates an expert committee—such as the working group
AGUR12, in the case of the revisions to the Copyright Act—that
consists of experts and participants who represent the stakes of
affected interest groups.246 After the committee’s report, the first
draft of the bill is sent to the cantons, the political parties, and
relevant interest groups in order to collect their views.247 The
process of sending the draft bill to parties beyond the
administrative body for the purpose of commenting is referred to
243
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as the ‘consultation procedure’. Though time-consuming, this
procedure is an effective instrument in enabling the general
public—and interest groups that lack the budget and network for
strategic lobbying—to participate in the federal legislative process,
because it ultimately allows anyone subject to the law to express
an opinion.
Despite its importance and storied history as a tradition of
Swiss governance, the consultation procedure in Switzerland was
not statutorily regulated until 2005, when the Federal Act on the
Consultation Procedure (“CPA”) was enacted.248 According to
Article 2 of the CPA, the purpose of the consultation procedure is
to allow the cantons, political parties, and interest groups to
participate in the shaping of opinion and the decision-making
process of the Confederation by providing information on material
accuracy, feasibility of implementation, and public acceptance of a
federal project.249 While the official invitation to participate in the
consultation procedure is limited to the parties mentioned above,
Article 4 of the CPA clarifies that anyone and any organization
may submit an opinion. Once an opinion has been submitted, it
must be acknowledged, considered, and evaluated by the authority
in charge of conducting the consultation procedure, which is either
the Federal Council or the Federal Department that proposes the
bill.
According to the Federal Council’s dispatch on the revision
of the CPA in 2013, these limited rights do not confer a legal
entitlement to being substantively considered in the legislative
decision.250 Since the revision in 2013, however, the authority in
charge of the procedure is bound to summarize the results of the
consultation procedure in a report that responds to all submitted
opinions and summarizes their content clearly and without bias.251
Further, all submitted opinions must be made publicly available by
permitting their inspection, providing copies, or publishing them in
248
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electronic form.252 As a consequence, the consultation procedure
not only allows engaged citizens to be heard, but also provides
interested citizens a summary of all arguments made both against
and in support of the proposed legislation.
4. Direct Democracy in Application
Granting direct democratic tools such as the consultation
procedure is not without consequences. A study conducted in 2006
showed that the pre-parliamentary phase stage in Switzerland lasts
an average of three years, followed by a parliamentary phase of
approximately another year.253 Assuming that legislators are
generally interested in rapidly bringing their projects to a close, it
is justifiable to ask whether the benefits of broader public
participation effectively offset the disadvantages affiliated with
legislative delay. But while answering this question largely comes
down to a matter of priorities, it would be wrong to assert that the
Swiss legislature has been inactive in recent years. Bearing in mind
that copyright legislation is a highly complex task that is further
complicated by the divergent interests of the parties involved, it
should come as no surprise that the ongoing revision of the Swiss
Copyright Act does not constitute an exception to the excessively
long duration of federal legislative projects.
Following the proposals of the working group AGUR12,
the Federal Council mandated the FDJP in June 2014 to prepare a
draft bill by the end of 2015.254 The draft bill was submitted on
December 11, 2015 and was open for public consultation until
March 31, 2016.255 Based on their results, the two chambers of the
federal parliament will separately debate both the draft bill and the
arguments brought forward during the consultation procedure.
Once both chambers agree on a joint version, the parliament will
pass a final version of the bill, which will be subject to the optional
252
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referendum.
Despite this clear roadmap, the International Intellectual
Property Alliance (“IIPA”) has long recommended placing
Switzerland on the USTR’s Watch List, arguing that Switzerland
“makes no claim that it lacks the resources or technological
expertise to make swift change.”256 In the IIPA’s view, the “fact
that online piracy continues to escape any liability in Switzerland
can only be attributed to a reluctance on the part of Swiss
leadership to live up to its obligations under international
agreements.”257
While the IIPA’s criticism seems to go only to the slowness
of Switzerland’s system, its choice of words ultimately reveals a
lack of understanding or sympathy for Switzerland’s direct
democratic approach. That Switzerland has not made a ‘swift
change’ has nothing to do with resources or technological
expertise; rather, it is based on the reality that proper policymaking
in a functioning democracy requires a spirit to compromise and the
willingness to take the time needed to find a proper balance of
interests. Since the deliberations between the copyright owners and
the general public have not yet revealed a consensus, the policy
change requested by the IIPA is much more than a matter of mere
implementation. The legislature in Switzerland understands that
the functioning of a democratic state governed by the rule of law is
not measured by the substance of the law, but rather by the
procedure that leads to its enactment.
Unfortunately, the USTR recently decided to follow the
IIPA’s unilateral requests, and placed Switzerland on the Watch
List in 2016. In its Special 301 Report, the USTR justified the
decision as follows:
“The United States welcomes the steps taken by
Switzerland in response to this serious concern […].
However, more remains to be done and the United
States continues to encourage the Swiss government to
move forward expeditiously with concrete and effective
256
257
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measures that address copyright piracy in an
appropriate and effective manner, including through
legislation, administrative action, consumer awareness,
public education, and voluntary stakeholder
initiatives.”
By putting Switzerland on the Special 301 Watch List, the
U.S. government has demonstrated its eagerness to observe the
revisions to the Swiss Copyright Act. Assuming that the U.S. is
acquainted with the legislative process in Switzerland, however, it
is unclear what value such encouragements are supposed to
contribute to the current debate. As a result of its direct democratic
instruments, the federal legislative process in Switzerland is to a
large extent immune from being influenced by foreign authorities.
While applying soft pressure might work on a government-togovernment level, the Swiss public’s opinion will at most be
negatively affected by reading about admonitory commentary from
the other side of the Atlantic. Unsurprisingly, the Head of the
Federal Institute of Intellectual Property recently declared that
further procedure with regard to the ongoing revision will depend
on the result of the consultation procedure, and not on the
placement on an American Watch List.258 Thus, instead of
criticizing Switzerland for seeking a workable compromise among
its citizens, the United States government might be well-advised to
shift its focus on the advantages of the Swiss system, and consider
whether they might in fact help solve some of its own issues.
IV.

LEARNING FROM SWITZERLAND

In a paper on the policymaking dynamics of ACTA and
SOPA/PIPA, Annemarie Bridy draws on German sociologist and
philosopher Jürgen Habermas’ discourse theory of procedural
democracy. She concludes that copyright policymaking requires
258
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both informal and formal mechanisms for allowing members of the
public to “talk back” to the government.259 Recognizing that
political compromise is necessary, Bridy argues that a
democratically legitimate compromise cannot be reached in an
“epistemic vacuum where corporate interests are the primary
drivers of policy formation, while other concerns are viewed as
irrelevant or incidental.”260 To secure democratic legitimacy in the
policymaking process, the public must be able to participate
directly, which requires not only a right to know, but also a right to
be heard.261 Building on this groundwork offered by Bridy, this
Article tries to propose a solution that might enhance the
democratic legitimacy of the legislative process in the United
States.
The strong public opposition which ultimately led to the
defeat of SOPA and PIPA emphasizes the importance of
counterbalancing the influence of lobbyists and special interest
groups in the legislative process. As such, Congress should
consider the events surrounding SOPA/PIPA as a valuable lesson
in policymaking for three distinct reasons. First, they illustrate that
the exclusion of certain groups, such as engineers and the legal
community, from the lawmaking process—intentional or
unintentional—can have drastic consequences for the success of
legislation. Second, the overwhelming public opposition that
materialized during the SOPA/PIPA protests illustrated that the
public, once sufficiently informed, demands an opportunity to be
heard and will not refrain from expressing its disapproval of
legislative proposals by signing petitions, sending emails, and
making phone calls to representatives. Third, and most
importantly, Internet companies such as Facebook, Twitter, and
Google have not only become increasingly active in the lobbying
field,262 but have also demonstrated their ability to successfully
259
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shape public opinion.263
As previously discussed, the Swiss legislature has
successfully narrowed the susceptibility of its legislative process to
lobbyism by enacting the Federal Act on the Consultation
Procedure in 2005. The CPA fulfills two equally important
functions. While the Act allows each citizen or interest group to
submit their opinions in the drafting phase, it also ensures that the
opinion’s content is summarized in a clear and unbiased manner
and that all such summaries are made available to the public.
The implementation of a public consultation procedure in
the federal legislative process in the United States would most
likely have prevented the SOPA/PIPA debacle. A mandatory
consultation procedure based on the Swiss legislative model would
have ensured that specialists were heard, eliminating the issues that
arose out of the fact that no single technical expert testified
regarding SOPA at the House Judiciary Committee. By taking the
specialists’ contributions into account, the drafters of the bill could
have met their concerns by adapting or deleting the most
controversial provisions. Instead, the public’s unheard disapproval
culminated in the SOPA protests, which had unfortunately become
the general public’s only real chance to be heard in the legislative
process. A public consultation procedure would have empowered
the Internet community to voice its opinion in a concise manner
and so indicated to Congress an overall lack of acceptance that
might possibly have been cured by weakening the draft.
Most importantly, the consultation procedure would have
ensured that the general public had access to an unbiased summary
of all arguments that have been made in support and against the
proposed legislation. Following the events surrounding the SOPA
protests, proponents of the bills argued that Wikipedia, Google,
and others manufactured controversy by “unfairly equating SOPA
with censorship” and crossed the “ethical boundary between the
neutral reporting of information and the presentation of editorial

25, 2016), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2016/02/25/apples-most-glaring-weakness-in-washington/.
263
Lev-Aretz, supra note 14 at 239.

2016] INFLUENCE OF INTEREST GROUPS ON COPYRIGHT LAW AND POLICY 57

opinions.”264 Regardless of whether these allegations were
justified, they raised an important point. Due to its accessibility,
the Internet today plays a pivotal role in the procurement of
information. While the Supreme Court’s holding that the Internet
must be awarded the full protection of the First Amendment is to
be welcomed,265 the widespread lack of accuracy and objectivity
on social media platforms and other websites can make it difficult
for individuals to form a balanced opinion. For a functioning
democracy, access to unbiased information is vital. The
implementation of a public consultation procedure would
undoubtedly help this cause, not only by creating a platform to
share information, but also by providing an impartial summary of
all opinions advanced to the general public.
A mandatory consultation procedure for federal legislative
proposals would further prevent Congress from passing
controversial legislative proposals such as CISPA (or CISA) as
part of an omnibus bill. Although a detailed analysis of the
deficiencies of omnibus legislation would go beyond the scope of
this Article, such legislation would naturally run afoul of any
policymaking process based on Jürgen Habermas’ ideas of
democratic legitimacy.
CONCLUSION
Due to the lack of consensus as to the definition of
copyright infringement in the United States, the current
international framework does not provide an effective solution to
copyright infringement caused or facilitated by websites outside of
the United States’ reach. The anti-piracy bills SOPA and PIPA,
introduced in 2011, were intended to address this problem on a
national level. Instead, these led to a public protest so powerful
that it effectively brought copyright legislation in the United States
264
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to a halt. While copyright-based industries have successfully
influenced U.S. copyright legislation since the enactment of the
1909 Copyright Act, the SOPA protests brought to light a fierce
resistance from various other interest groups. As a result of this
resistance, the proposed votes on the bills have been postponed
until a wider agreement on a solution can be found.
As explained in Part II, it is likely that the events
surrounding SOPA and PIPA will remain unique. Nevertheless, the
protests exposed the shortcomings of the legislative process in the
United States. Combined with the divergent interests between the
parties affected by copyright law, the lack of public inclusion
renders a workable solution unlikely. Presuming that compromise
is the only way to break this political deadlock, this Article
recommends a solution using the Swiss federal legislative process
as a model. Although Switzerland’s mandatory procedure slows
the legislative process considerably, the inclusion of citizens
subject to the law endows the legislative process with the required
democratic legitimacy.
Recognizing that the eventual legislative proposal cannot
consider each and every opinion expressed, the consultation
procedure nevertheless allows engaged citizens to be heard and
provides interested citizens a summary of all arguments that are
being made both in support and against the legislative proposal.
The procedure further ensures that experts can be heard by the
legislator. The earlier the experts’ voices are heard, the bigger the
odds that a controversial legislative proposal can be adjusted in
time to minimize its negative impact. Last, but not least, the
consultation procedure serves as an effective counterbalance to
prevent special interest groups from asserting undue influence over
the legislative process. Thus, the procedure enhances public
acceptance of copyright law and policy.
Ultimately, this Article argues that the implementation of a
public consultation procedure based on the Swiss model would: (1)
make federal copyright legislation less susceptible to lobbying and
thus prevent the inclusion of infeasible and ill-considered
provisions; (2) enhance the U.S.’s democratic legitimacy and
overall acceptance of copyright legislation by allowing citizens to
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participate in public policymaking; (3) inform the general public
about the actual consequences of the proposal by providing an
overview of the opinions advanced in its support or opposition; and
(4) ultimately help to break the existing standoff in copyright
policymaking by creating a compromise that properly balances the
diverging interests of copyright owners and the general public.

PRACTICE POINTERS






With the exception of computer programs, the download of
copyrighted works for private use does not constitute
copyright infringement in Switzerland and is protected by
the so called private use exception. The upload of
copyrighted works to unknown persons, however, is not
covered by this exception.
The Federal Supreme Court in Switzerland considers IP
addresses as personal data protected by the Federal Act on
Data Protection, provided that they relate to an identified or
identifiable person. This means that, without consent, IP
addresses cannot be processed in order to de-anonymize
users of peer-to-peer networks.
The Swiss Copyright Act is currently under revision and
will presumably be enacted within the following two years.
As such, attorneys with Swiss interests should not base
long-term advice on provisions under review
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